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In 2000, the ASEAN member countries signed the UN Millennium 
Declaration to eradicate extreme poverty in the world by 2015 through the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs 
represented the global vision of reducing poverty in its various dimen-
sions, and they were mainstreamed in the process of building the ASEAN 
Socio-cultural Community, which had a similar target date of 2015.1 The 
new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) framework approved in 2015 
goes beyond the MDG agenda, which focused solely on poverty, to also 
include inequality. In recent years, inequality has been worsening amidst 
rapid economic growth and falling poverty rates. Inequality can reduce the 
impact of economic growth on poverty reduction. Conversely, reduced in-
equality will increase the efficiency of poverty reduction. Unequal societies 
and countries can achieve a high level of growth but cannot sustain it. Thus, 
addressing inequalities will help in attaining and maintaining growth, which 
in turn is a necessary condition for reducing poverty. Furthermore, reduc-
ing inequality will help in easing social tensions, deepening social capital, 
and improving peace and order, which are all crucial to poverty reduction, 
thus also making growth more inclusive.
At the heart of the post-2015 framework to address poverty and inequal-
ity is the adoption of an inclusive and sustainable growth model. Inclusive 
growth is growth that is broad based and benefits the majority of the 
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population. One of the primary goals of the ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership signed in 2008 is the establishment of a “framework 
for the enhancement of economic cooperation among the Parties with a 
view to supporting ASEAN economic integration, bridging the develop-
ment gap among ASEAN Member States, and enhancing trade and invest-
ment among the Parties.” This was reiterated in the Bali Declaration of 2011, 
which “reaffirm(ed) the commitment of ASEAN and Japan to work closely 
in supporting ASEAN integration and narrowing the development gap in 
the region, and reaffirm(ed) the support of the Government of Japan in the 
implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, with a view 
to intensifying the flow of trade, investment, tourism and people-to-people 
interaction.”2 
Within this context, the main objective of this chapter is to propose mea-
sures for how the ASEAN-Japan partnership can contribute to the global 
governance of reducing poverty and inequality in the post-MDG era. It 
attempts to address the following questions: How can the ASEAN-Japan 
partnership tackle global poverty and inequality to ensure that economic 
growth is inclusive and benefits the greatest number of people? And how can 
the ASEAN-Japan partnership contribute to harnessing economic growth 
for a more equitable distribution of opportunity and income? 
G l o b a l  G o v e r n a n c e  I n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  I s s u e s 
R e l a t e d  t o  P o v e r t y  a n d  I n e q u a l i t y
The number of people in the developing world living on less than Us$1.25 a 
day fell from 52 percent in 1981 to 43 percent in 1990 and to 21 percent in 2010 
(at 2005 prices), but as of 2015, as the MDGs concluded, some 836 million 
people were still living in extreme poverty.3 In 1990, the proportion of the 
population living in poverty in East Asia and the Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, 
and South Asia ranged from 54 percent to 56 percent. Poverty has decreased 
rapidly in East Asia and the Pacific, falling from 56 percent to 14 percent of 
the population by 2010. In South Asia poverty fell by 18 percentage points 
in 2008, while in sub-Saharan Africa it declined from 56 percent to 47 per-
cent of the population. For the least developed countries (LDCs) overall, 
the decline from 1990 to 2008 was from 65 percent to 47 percent.4 Among 
ASEAN countries in 2008 and 2009, the poverty incidence of Us$1.25 per 
day on a purchasing price parity (PPP) basis is varied, ranging from a low of 
almost nil in Thailand and Malaysia to a high of 20.42 percent for Indonesia. 
If the threshold is set at Us$2.00 a day (PPP), around half of the population 
in Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia is still below the poverty line. 
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The global financial crisis of 2008 and the various recent natural and 
man-made disasters hitting specific countries may be slowing down pov-
erty reduction in some regions of the world. Furthermore, inequality has 
been increasing, especially within countries. Thus poverty and inequality 
remain important problems that national and global governance institutions 
continue to confront year after year.
Domestically, poverty and inequality are affected by the set of programs 
and policies formulated and implemented by national governments, usually 
in collaboration with other stakeholders. In terms of external actors, global 
institutions—various multilateral and bilateral agencies—play different 
roles in tackling poverty and inequality at both the global and country 
levels. These include the impact of financial and trade policies that govern 
the conduct of countries internationally (especially the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and the World Trade Organization, or WTO) and the amount 
of financial flows going into a certain country through development assis-
tance (from bilateral and multilateral institutions like the United Nations), 
direct investments (from foreign and multinational corporations), and 
even remittances (from overseas workers). Global institutions contribute 
to poverty reduction and the amelioration of inequality through the fol-
lowing mechanisms:
1. Provision of knowledge and information: These institutions generate 
various data and statistics and provide comparative analyses of such 
data. Studies and reports are developed for possible use in the poverty 
and inequality planning of various governments.
2. Provision of technical assistance, loans, and grants: These institutions 
provide resources in various forms to assist governments in implement-
ing poverty and inequality reduction programs and projects.
3. Advocacy: Through these institutions, particular advocacy themes are 
pushed forward in the form of recommended polices and programs. 
Global institutions allocate resources to mount such advocacy activities.
4. Promotion of trade, financial, and other development-related policies 
that may affect poverty and inequality across and within nations.
However, critics and analysts have argued that global governance in 
reducing poverty and inequality has fallen short of its goals despite the 
MDGs. Clapp and Wilkinson, in the introduction to their book in which 
various experts contribute to an examination of global governance in rela-
tion to poverty and inequality, conclude that “global governance has been 
far from successful; moreover, we find that the various actors that combine 
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to constitute contemporary global governance have actually perpetuated, 
entrenched, and extended a socio-economic model that privileges the 
market and facilitates the accumulation of wealth and resources among 
a small elite . . . in the face of mounting evidence that more needs to be 
done.”5 Others contend that some of these institutions have actually been 
successful in specific country contexts or, more precisely, in terms of par-
ticular programs that worked in moving people out of poverty. Prominent 
economists like Jeffrey Sachs also contend that these institutions have failed 
because the resources they use are too little to create impact. Many donor 
countries do not even reach the goal of providing 0.7 percent of gross na-
tional income (GNI) in development assistance. For example, only a few 
European countries achieved the commitments they made in Monterrey 
(in 2002) and Barcelona (in 2005) to provide 0.7 percent of their GNI as 
overseas development assistance (ODA) by 2015, and no donors from other 
parts of the world have achieved that goal yet either.6 
E l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  P o s t - M D G  F r a m e w o r k  f o r 
R e du c i n g  P o v e r t y  a n d  I n e q u a l i t y:  
Th e  G o v e r n a n c e  C o n t e x t  o f  a  
G l o b a l  F u t u r e  a f t e r  2 0 15
Altered Power Dynamics
The balance of geopolitical power is changing. For many decades this has 
revolved around Western Europe and the United States. Over the next 50 
years, China and India are likely to increase their share of power in the global 
system, with the United States and Europe claiming less. This trend is likely 
to continue, barring any monumental events such as a world war or an envi-
ronmental catastrophe. As noted in the European Report on Development 2013, 
“Other countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa and Turkey are also building up significant international influence, 
especially in their own regions, where their size and economic importance 
have enhanced their role as ‘anchors’ in relation to their neighbors, as well 
as their central role in international partnerships.”7
Increasing Role of Nonstate Actors
In recent decades, nonstate actors on the global stage, such as multinational 
corporations, have gained influence over governments in many countries. 
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They dominate in a number of areas, including energy, finance, mining, 
pharmaceuticals, chemicals, shipping, and mechanized agriculture. Ever 
since the World Social Forum was held in 2001 in Porto Alegre, Brazil, as 
a counterpoint to the regularly held World Economic Forum in Davos, 
the global civil society movement has increased its profile and has been a 
prominent critic of large international business. In the development field, 
big business—through its corporate social responsibility arms—and in-
ternational civil society are both active and trying to assert their influence 
in the resolution of global issues like poverty and climate change, among 
others. Faith-based fundamentalist movements have also increased their 
profile in recent years and have been major actors in terrorist activities all 
over the world.
Rise of Regional Institutions
The last two decades have seen a growing role played by regional bodies 
such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, the Mercado 
Común del Sur, and the African Union. Most recently, an agreement among 
a select group of countries was reached on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP). Some of these institutions have tried to forge agreements on issues 
that were not being resolved at a global level, such as free trade arrangements. 
These formations are also sometimes useful in terms of collective lobbying 
and negotiations of international agreements and in geopolitical concerns. 
Call for Reforms in Key Institutions
According to one study, there have also been calls to improve the credibility 
and effectiveness of existing institutional global mechanisms. The legitimacy 
of the UN Security Council (UNSC) has been called into question, and 
emerging powers including Brazil, India, and South Africa are advocating for 
reforms to that body. Experts from various sectors have also been clamoring 
for reforms in the Bretton Woods Institutions—the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank.8
New Development Paradigms
Post–World War II development policy has evolved from “rich” countries 
providing aid contributions to “poor” countries, to the promotion of 
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market-oriented global economic regimes, and to inducements for gov-
ernance reform within developing countries. There has also been a change 
from purely “economic growth is development” thinking to discussions of 
“human and sustainable development.” At the same time, there has been 
an increasing interest shown in “South–South” cooperation (SSC), as large 
developing economies search for alternative sources of inputs and new 
markets, while poorer nations try to diversify their sources of development 
assistance. Brazil, China, India, and South Africa represent some of the big-
gest contributors overall in terms of emerging donors in SSC. More recently, 
we have seen how the development of a nation can be severely derailed by 
man-made disasters (conflicts and wars) and natural disasters (earthquakes, 
tsunamis, and super typhoons). Thus, a new global development framework 
must consider states that are vulnerable to these kinds of events.
Difficulties in Forging Consensus in Global Agreements
Recent experiences with international agreements based on consensus de-
cision making, like the negotiations at the 2013 climate change conference 
in Warsaw or the trade conference in Bali that year, show how difficult it is 
to forge a consensus. Also, the altered power dynamics may result in new 
alignments and coalitions in international agreement negotiations. The post-
2015 development framework is definitely complex, as it seeks to build on 
both the MDGs and the goals set out at the Rio+20 conference, expanding 
the agenda from the 10 MDGs to a total of 17 interconnected SDGs. Some 
countries achieved the MDGs even without multilateral cooperation and 
assistance and, thus, may not support or need new global arrangements, 
and others achieved theirs through trade expansion and bilateral support, 
leading to different perspectives on how the post-2015 agenda should be 
pursued. Another problem is figuring out how to include different actors’ 
varying priorities in agreements and how to get agreements that are suf-
ficiently detailed to produce concrete and measurable results.
However, there were strong constituencies that pushed for the new SDG 
agreement—the UN and its High-level Panel on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda, bilateral development agencies, “Northern” nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), and the LDCs themselves, which wanted a cred-
ible successor to the MDGs because they saw the international attention 
brought about by the targets as well as the increased ODA resources that 
went along with them.9 
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Incorporating Poor People’s Experiences
Understanding poor people’s experiences of poverty and marginalization 
can help in prioritizing responses to poverty and inequality by clarifying 
dimensions to be addressed and highlighting essential aspects, such as the 
importance of relationships and of the dignity and rights of poor people. 
Participatory mechanisms that can take the actual pulse and elicit the 
thinking of the poor will be important for the acceptability and credibility 
of the post-2015 agreement as it is implemented in the coming years. They 
will ultimately decide the impact of development policies and whether such 
policies are inclusive. Related to this, it may be important to examine the 
characteristics of people who have successfully moved out of poverty, as 
well as the various pathways that people have taken out of poverty, such as 
education and access to capital, among others. 
Th e  E l e m e n t s  a n d  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  a n 
E v o lv i n g  N e w  F r a m e w o r k
Relevance to Diverse Nationalities 
As noted in the European Development Report 2013, “The challenges and 
needs of developing countries vary considerably according to their eco-
nomic structure, human capacity, political situation, geography and inherent 
vulnerabilities.” As such, the post-2015 framework will need to reflect these 
unique contexts.10 If a major objective of the post-2015 SDGs is to catalyze 
reforms at the global and national levels, then it must be implemented in 
such a way that it becomes relevant even in the context of diverse national re-
alities. The framework should have flexibility in the choice of indicators and 
specific targets, which will facilitate greater ownership and accountability. 
Structural Transformation 
The European Report on Development 2013 is correct in noting that a greater 
emphasis on the promotion of structural transformation, and particularly 
on job creation, will be essential for sustainable economic and social de-
velopment around the world. Structural transformation is a process of 
product diversification; upgrading toward the production of higher quality, 
more complex, and high-value-added products; and deepening linkages 
within the economy by developing local parts manufacturing and ancillary 
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services. This may involve fundamental changes that will be different from 
the current development paradigm. A transformational agenda will require 
a greater emphasis on state-market dynamics, including a strategic role for 
governments, especially if new types of industrial policies will be pursued 
to promote the manufacturing sectors of the developing economies. As 
many economists observe, good quality jobs for less educated workers 
can be provided by the manufacturing sector. Industrial policies must also 
be aligned with international trade strategies, which in turn will require 
cooperation with other countries around the world. 
Promotion of Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development  
As already discussed above, the new post-MDG framework covers a range 
of global issues that affect development outcomes, such as risks and vulner-
abilities, climate change, technological change, and consumption patterns. 
The eradication of poverty is still a major goal, but achieving it necessitates 
the adoption of development strategies that are both inclusive and sustain-
able. The framework must also build on the multidimensionality of poverty 
and tackle the challenge of relative poverty, in part by advancing social 
inclusion as a way to address the problem of inequality. The exclusion of 
various societal groups and the growing inequality among them threatens 
to jeopardize sustained economic growth, even while the poor and mar-
ginalized are also impacted greatly by environmental degradation and the 
advance of climate change.
Policy Coherence and Alignment 
The European Report on Development 2013 also notes the need for the 
policy space of governments to be respected and this is particularly impor-
tant from the perspective of Asia,. National governments need to be given 
sufficient leeway in determining their own development priorities, as well 
as in formulating approaches to development finance, trade and invest-
ment, and migration. The policies that shape these areas have important 
implications for development, so it is also crucial that they be designed in a 
coherent manner. Various interventions by national and local governments, 
development partners, and other stakeholders must be coordinated and 
aligned with a country’s development strategy. At the same time, these need 
to be linked up with the numerous international processes put in place to 
support inclusive and sustainable development and deal with a range of 
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global challenges. The efficacy of these efforts depends on the ability to cre-
ate complementarities and synergies among all these processes. Therefore, 
the SDGs may best be understood as a framework that converges in a series 
of mutually supporting agendas.
Diversified Sources of Development Finance 
Domestic resources should be the foremost source of finance for develop-
ment because they provide the greatest policy leverage. Private domestic 
investment and foreign direct investment (FDI) are also important, espe-
cially if structural transformation is desired, and thus should be supported. 
Providers of SSC should be encouraged to strengthen their contribution as 
it offers additional choices and opportunities to partner countries. Levels 
of ODA should be maintained and ideally increased, and ODA should be 
allocated in ways that optimize its impact. Finally, to improve the effective-
ness and complementarity of different types of development finance, it is 
important to encourage transparency regarding financial flows.11 
More Extensive International Multistakeholder and Collective 
Action 
Achieving the original vision of the Millennium Declaration will require 
ongoing and considerably greater international collective action through 
global public policies. Such collective action is essential to establishing an 
international environment that is conducive to sustainable and inclusive 
development and to tackling global issues that affect the ability of individual 
countries to achieve development outcomes (e.g., in the areas of develop-
ment finance, trade and investment, and migration). Developed countries, 
such as the United States, Japan, and countries of the EU, should enhance 
their support for the new framework by actively participating in collective 
action in other development fields, such as trade, migration, international 
finance, and climate change. Also, nonstate actors must be given roles to 
play in the new framework. 
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Vi s u a l i z i n g  a  N e w  D e v e l o p m e n t  F r a m e w o r k  i n 
t h e  P o s t - 2 0 15  E r a
Given the various issues and considerations, as well as the suggested ele-
ments and characteristics of the new development framework in the post-
2015 era, figure 1 presents a depiction of the main components and strategies 
needed to attain inclusive growth and sustainable development. As has been 
discussed in many fora, countries all over the world need to include a vast 
majority of their population in creating higher economic growth, and the 
benefits emanating from such growth must also accrue to those who made 
this happen. This is explicitly reflected in the SDGs announced this year.
To achieve inclusive growth and sustainable development, three major 
thrusts must be given priority at the national level—reduction of multidi-
mensional poverty and inequality, environmental management, and jobs 
generation from high and sustained economic growth. As seen in figure 1, 
each thrust has specific strategies to be undertaken to be able to contribute to 
inclusive growth and sustainable development. It must also be emphasized 
that at the country level, action must also be collective and it must involve 
multiple stakeholders. At the global level, countries can also participate in 
pushing for a milieu that will facilitate and contribute to the attainment 
Figure 1. Framework for inclusive growth and sustainable development in the 
post-2015 era
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of these twin goals. Various stakeholders can collectively advocate for key 
global activities like increased FDI, greater labor mobility, international 
trade and environmental agreements, higher levels of ODA, and SSC.
R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  f o r  A S E A N - J a pa n 
Pa r t n e r s h i p  i n  a  P o s t - 2 0 15  
D e v e l o p m e n t  F r a m e w o r k
The ASEAN-Japan Partnership and Its Current Contributions to 
Poverty and Inequality Reduction
The Bali Declaration
On November 18, 2011, during the 14th ASEAN-Japan Summit in Bali, 
Indonesia, the heads of state of ASEAN countries and Japan adopted the 
Plan of Action to Implement the Joint Declaration for Enhancing ASEAN-
Japan Strategic Partnership for Prospering Together and endorsed five 
strategies: strengthening political-security cooperation in the region; in-
tensifying cooperation toward ASEAN community building; enhancing 
ASEAN-Japan connectivity for consolidating ties between ASEAN and 
Japan; creating a more disaster-resilient society; and addressing common 
regional and global challenges. This joint statement was dubbed the “Bali 
Declaration” and it set into motion the strategies that the partnership will 
implement in supporting ASEAN integration and narrowing the devel-
opment gap in the region, which includes the Master Plan on ASEAN 
Connectivity to intensify the flow of trade, investment, tourism, and 
people-to-people interaction. Various types of action taken from this recent 
declaration define and specify the possible roles of ASEAN-Japan partner-
ship in contributing to poverty and inequality reduction in a post-2015 era.
Japan’s ODA 
ODA is still the primary means that Japan has to use in partnership with 
ASEAN to contribute to both global and regional governance in poverty 
reduction. Japan has been by far the largest bilateral donor to Southeast 
Asia. According to Hugh Patrick, “Between 1969 and 2004, 65 percent [of 
ODA to countries in the region] was in concessionary yen loans, 20 percent 
in technical assistance and 15 percent in untied grants; the amount and type 
of aid has depended upon each recipient’s size and level of development.”12 
This assistance has always been a complementary and integrated component 
of Japan’s strategy to increase trade and FDI in Southeast Asia. Despite fiscal 
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difficulties on the home front, the large amount of Japanese ODA and its 
synergies with trade and FDI have been instrumental to Japan’s economic 
and political partnership with ASEAN. According to the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency ( JICA), Japan’s total ODA disbursements in 2012 
amounted to Us$18.6 billion (¥1.5 trillion). Of this total, grant aid accounted 
for Us$3.6 billion (¥283.8 billion), technical cooperation Us$3.7 billion 
(¥294.5 billion), and loan aid Us$7.7 billion (¥617.8 billion).13 
The government of Japan also established the Japan Fund for Poverty 
Reduction ( JFPR) in May 2000 in support of the Asian Development 
Bank’s (ADB) poverty reduction strategy that was approved in 1999. JFPR 
grants are not meant to be used for technical assistance but are given to 
finance investment grants related to ADB loans for pilot testing innovative 
poverty reduction approaches that may be scaled up under loan conditions 
or mainstreamed in ADB operations. The grants also offer opportunities 
for the ADB to partner with civil society by working with NGOs and com-
munity-based organizations and directly with communities themselves.14
Current Programs and Projects on the Reduction of Poverty 
and Inequality
ASEAN and Japan are already cooperating on efforts to reduce poverty 
and inequality in the region through a number of initiatives, including the 
following: 
•	 Japan	has	assisted	in	strengthening	connectivity	in	ASEAN	through	sup-
port for the creation of the Vital Artery for the East-West and the Southern 
Economic Corridors and the Maritime Economic Corridor, and it has 
also provided support for soft infrastructure projects in ASEAN and 
has funded more than 30 flagship projects related to the three ASEAN 
corridors.15
•	 Japan	provides	 support	 for	 several	of	ASEAN’s	 subregional	coopera-
tion arrangements, including the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), 
the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT), and 
the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). These subgroupings are able to attract 
investment and technology, and serve as “building blocks for ASEAN 
regionalism,” and they can thereby help alleviate inequality in the region.16
•	 Japan’s	long	experience	with	small	and	medium-sized	enterprise	(SME)	
development is providing lessons for ASEAN, including through the fol-
lowing mechanisms: (1) internal learning and entrepreneurial activities; 
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(2) policy and program development for SMEs, including financing, 
preferential taxation, technology development, human resource devel-
opment, and start-up support services; (3) promotion of the participa-
tion of ASEAN SMEs in production networks in the region; and (4) 
strengthening of the SME Working Group in the ASEAN Economic 
Ministers—Minister for Economy, Trade, and Industry (AEM-METI) 
Economic and Industrial Cooperation Committee.17 
•	 Japan	has	contributed	to	ASEAN	community	building	and	to	strength-
ening the regional body through the Japan-ASEAN Solidarity Fund in 
1999, the Japan-ASEAN General Exchange Fund in 2000, and the Japan-
ASEAN Integration Fund in 2006.18 
•	 Human	resource	development	is	promoted	through	the	annual	ASEAN	
& Japan High Level Officials Meeting on Caring Societies and the 
implementation of the ASEAN-Japan Collaboration Programme for 
Strengthening the Basis of Human Resources Development in Cambodia, 
Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam (CLMV) Countries.19 
•	 Japan	 is	 funding	 several	 programs	 to	 support	migrant	workers	 in	
Southeast Asia through the ILO, including a grant of Us$2 million to 
support an initiative aimed at protecting migrant workers in Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, and Thailand, which includes “developing a ‘knowledge 
base’ on migration issues for policy makers and building up the capacity 
of governments to manage orderly labor migration.” Other projects are 
addressing human trafficking in the region.20 
•	 Japan	has	been	strengthening	its	cooperation	with	ASEAN	on	disaster	
management by convening seminars, dispatching personnel from the 
ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA 
Centre), training and building the capacity of rescue teams, providing 
support to improve the AHA Centre’s communication facilities and stock-
pile systems, and developing a regional network for disaster preparedness 
and disaster relief—the Disaster Management Network for the ASEAN 
Region—with the AHA Centre as the hub.21
•	 Japan	has	been	supporting	MDG-related	 issues	 through	programs	on	
maternal health, basic education, and water provision. For example, JICA 
implemented a technical cooperation project in Indonesia called Ensuring 
Maternal and Child Health Service with the Maternal and Child Health 
Handbook, and in Cambodia it worked on improvements to the water 
supply and sewerage systems in urban areas.22 Support also takes the form 
of cooperation schemes such as the Third Country Training Program, 
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where “JICA has financially and technically supported its development 
partners to transfer their expertise or to re-transfer Japanese expertise to 
a third country,” and the JICA-ASEAN Regional Cooperation Meeting 
( JARCOM), which features an annual cycle for selecting, implement-
ing, and monitoring projects. Well over 100 projects were conducted 
from 2004 to 2009 through JARCOM, many of which were related to 
the MDGs.23
How the ASEAN-Japan Partnership Can Contribute to the Gover-
nance of Poverty and Inequality Reduction in the Post-2015 Era
As the plans for implementing the SDGs continue to be fleshed out, 
ASEAN and Japan should advocate for a post-2015 global development 
framework that builds upon the MDGs in a way that is integrated into a 
vision of inclusive and sustainable development, as visualized in figure 1. 
This post-2015 framework should focus on a multidimensional poverty 
agenda that seeks to include the sustainable development concerns de-
lineated at the Rio+20 conference. The partnership should also advocate 
for mutually supportive international agreements in various areas where 
they are necessary to achieve the overall vision (e.g., climate change, mi-
gration, and trade).
Second, the partnership can provide input into the post-2015 framework 
by sharing collective and individual experiences in the governance of pov-
erty and inequality reduction, including specific policies, programs, and 
projects. The most valuable contributions of the ASEAN-Japan partner-
ship to the new global framework for development will be made through a 
range of policies and programs that go beyond development cooperation 
in the strict sense of the term to address areas such as trade, migration, 
disaster management, SME development, and SSC through subregional 
development. 
The partnership should highlight the following points in order to contrib-
ute to the post-2015 global governance of poverty and inequality reduction:
Structural Transformation 
• Emphasize the need for industrial structural transformation in develop-
ing economies and the importance of integration into global and regional 
production networks.
Structural transformation is needed to upgrade manufacturing and indus-
tries in the developing economies. Regional and global value chains are 
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important mechanisms for upgrading manufacturing, and it is important 
for developing countries to be fully integrated into regional and global pro-
duction networks. Within the region, ASEAN can benefit and learn from 
Japan’s postwar transformation as well as its successful experience in linking 
SMEs with production networks. Globally, ASEAN-Japan partnership can 
promote the role of regional production networks in enhancing trade as 
well as in deepening SME participation in these networks. 
Trade and Investment
•	Adopt an inclusive growth and sustainable development strategy as an in-
direct approach to reducing poverty and diminishing inequality, highlighting 
the employment and environmental impacts of such a strategy.
The success of Asia has shown that trade and investment play central roles 
in raising incomes and living standards in low-income countries and LDCs. 
Much of Asia’s dynamism is due to increasing regional economic integration 
and strong trade and investment links. There are three important challenges 
that must be addressed. First, methods are needed to connect trade and 
investment policies to structural transformation.24 Second, in order for the 
WTO to move beyond the Doha Development Agenda and include other 
issues such as the linkages between trade and finance or climate change, it 
should consider moving its agenda beyond a narrow focus on trade liber-
alization to include a broader range of trade policies that can be helpful in 
dealing with these global challenges.25 This might also include addressing the 
many barriers impeding the smooth functioning of production networks.26 
Third, even though deeper trade integration is more likely to proceed at the 
bilateral and regional levels in the current global environment, it is impor-
tant to ensure that the WTO remains the guardian of trade rules, norms, 
and knowledge that are supportive of development.27 In light of the above, 
the ASEAN-Japan partnership could promote deeper regional integration 
with the WTO at the helm. 
Importance of Labor Mobility 
• Highlight the need for international and regional frameworks to manage 
the temporary migration of workers.
Huge amounts of remittances from migrants working abroad already play a 
significant role in financing development. Official remittances to develop-
ing countries in 2012 were nearly three times the amount of ODA to those 
countries and exceeded private debt and portfolio equity flows.28 Informal 
remittance flows may even be larger. Freer labor mobility could catalyze 
global economic growth and reduce poverty in migrant-sending countries. 
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Yet, we lack an international regulatory regime and framework for such 
labor mobility. The post-2015 framework should acknowledge migrants’ 
rights and the potential benefits of greater global labor mobility in relation 
to reducing poverty and addressing demographic change. The framework 
should highlight the need for migrant-receiving governments to agree to 
establish international rules and institutions that govern the temporary 
migration of low-skilled workers. At the same time, the framework must 
also emphasize the need to harness the benefits from labor mobility toward 
structural transformation in the sending countries. ASEAN can contribute 
to this important arena because it already signed a regional framework in 
2007, the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights of Migrant Workers, which outlines the general principles, obliga-
tions, and commitments of member countries, whether they are sending 
or receiving countries for migrant workers. Both the sending nations—the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia—and the receiving coun-
tries—Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia—have accumulated experience 
in terms of policies and programs to promote and protect the rights of 
migrant workers.
Management of Risks and Vulnerabilities 
• Stress the need to manage risks and vulnerabilities through social protection 
systems and measures appropriate for developing economies.
Financial Stability  Without macroeconomic and financial stability, it 
is difficult to for countries to move forward. The 2008 global financial crisis 
overturned some of the development gains made under the rubric of the 
MDGs. Therefore, the post-2015 development framework should include 
inputs for reforming the international financial and monetary system to 
lessen instability. Poor countries can have their policy responses and de-
velopment strategies undermined by volatility and unpredictability in the 
public and private international financial flows. ASEAN-Japan partnership 
can contribute in this area, as ASEAN has deep experience gained from the 
1997 financial crisis and post-crisis activities, especially in the establishment 
of surveillance mechanisms.
Disaster Risk Management  The post-2015 framework calls on nations 
to address vulnerabilities due to natural disasters. Japan can share its exper-
tise in disaster preparedness and management, as can the Philippines and 
Indonesia, which have experience with various disasters that tested their 
capabilities in relief, rehabilitation, and recovery (e.g., the 2004 tsunami 
in the Indian Ocean and super typhoon Haiyan, which devastated part of 
the Philippines). All three countries are in the “ring of fire” and have been 
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plagued by frequent earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
Social Protection Systems and Policies  The post-2015 framework 
needs to integrate various options for social protection from which develop-
ing countries may be able to select and adopt or adapt, as their needs and 
resources may differ from those of Western and other developed countries. 
Indonesia and the Philippines can share their recent experience providing 
conditional cash transfers to poor citizens. ASEAN nations can also share 
their experience with microfinance and microinsurance, which countries 
like the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia have already 
implemented through several projects with their marginalized citizens. Such 
social protection programs are important for reducing the vulnerability of 
the poor in many countries. 
Food Security  Another area where ASEAN and Japan can contribute is 
by sharing their experience in establishing a food security framework and 
information system—the ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement 
and the ASEAN Food Security Information System—that may be useful 
during food crises. At the country level, the CLMV countries have already 
made advances on food security while prioritizing the need to strengthen 
social safety nets in order to deal better with contagion from international 
financial crises, food price shocks, and natural disasters.29 
Alternative Resource Mobilization
• Advocate for widening resource mobilization that includes South-South 
cooperation, similar to what the ASEAN countries are attempting through 
subregional frameworks and collaboration.
South-South Cooperation  Because the new development framework 
will require additional resources, alternative ways of mobilizing resources 
should be proposed. SSC provides new options and opportunities for de-
veloping countries. It can also allow governments to retain flexibility and 
freedom from outside constraints in their policymaking. As noted above, 
ASEAN has embarked on subregional cooperation, which is one form of 
South-South cooperation. The experience of ASEAN in the formation of 
the GMS, BIMP-EAGA, and IMT-GT can be a source of knowledge and 
information in formulating strategies for SSC all over the world.
Global Poverty and Inequality Reduction Fund  Japan and 
ASEAN can share their experience handling Japanese ODA for this pur-
pose. For example, the Japan Poverty Reduction Fund ( JPRF) gives grants 
to innovative projects in ASEAN in partnership with the governments of 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Timor Leste, and Vietnam. 
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This type of ODA program is considered to have been “relevant, efficient, 
effective, and sustainable.”30 ASEAN and Japan can propose a global fund 
patterned after the JPRF where major development partners can contrib-
ute resources to fund innovative projects in partnership with civil society 
groups and poor communities.
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